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ABSTRACT
As global warming and climate Variability bring about more frequent and intense
rainstorms and accelerate sea level rise, our social and built environments are at
heightened risk of flood induced damages and consequent costs. This is particularly true
for coastal areas, facing the coupled effects of these threats while serving as home to
people, businesses, unique landscapes, and historic landmarks. Complex decisions at all
levels of government and community planning stand to benefit from increased
understanding of possible outcomes and pathways resulting from decentralized human
behavior and decision making in the realm of water resources engineering and
management. Game theory has allowed scientists to better understand and predict
preferred strategies and interactions of rational self-interested actors in multi-player
games. In coalitional games, players are able to work together to increase their individual
utility payoffs through formation of strategic subsets, or coalitions. When applied to
water resources management dilemmas such as infrastructure development and planning,
this practice can be used to identify which and what variety of coalitions should form to
benefit their overall hydrologic system. This research aims to determine ideal green
infrastructure location and spending scenarios within Charleston, South Carolina’s
Market Street watershed using a coalitional game theory solution concept, the Shapley
value, in combination with rainfall-runoff simulation. Results offer insights to stormwater
services and flood managers concerning suggested areas of focus for green infrastructure
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spending and advocacy for the purpose of reducing flooding and resulting property
damages.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Climate variations promise to disproportionately affect the world’s coastal
systems by way of exacerbated precipitation event frequency and intensity in tandem
with sea level rise and increasing storm surge severity. With these changes come
heightened and additional risks to infrastructure, ecological, and socio-economic systems
in coastal settings. Property damage can mean not only physical and financial threats to
individuals and businesses but increasing vulnerability for local economies and cultural
landscapes by way of environmental degradation as well. As the effectiveness of existing
traditional infrastructure designed under stationarity assumptions wanes in the light of
these changes (Milly et al., 2008), potential for implementation of decentralized green
infrastructure (GI) for stormwater management is on the rise (Meney & Pantelic, 2022).
Governing and planning actors at all levels must address increasingly complex
programming

problems

concerning

placement,

funding,

and

effectiveness

of

infrastructure projects. As such, these groups are increasingly advocating for individual
home and business owner participation in local runoff and flood reduction strategies.
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
This research explores the applicability of coalitional game theory analysis to
inform GI placement in an urban coastal watershed to demonstrate the potential system-
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wide effects of the adoption of widespread, decentralized GI. The objectives of this study
are as follows:
1. Provide an overview of the threats floods and related hazards pose to
environmental, physical, and social systems within coastal communities
and review existing methods of modeling human behavior and decision
making in the realm of water resources management.
2. Discuss the benefits and drawbacks of various traditional and GI method
deployment in these communities for the purpose of minimizing runoff
and reducing local flooding.
3. Develop a 1D stormwater model to simulate various GI installation
scenario effects on runoff volumes, flooding, and consequent property
damages.
4. Investigate coalitional game theory concepts and their applicability to
informing GI planning concerns, including cost effectiveness and
placement.
1.3 LAYOUT OF THESIS
The layout of the presented research is as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an overview of climate variation induced challenges facing
coastal communities and explains an ongoing need for the introduction of widespread
decentralized GI in these areas to aid existing, aged traditional means of infrastructure
through increased stormwater management capacity. Additionally, effects of increasing
flood frequency on historically significant coastal areas, in the context of cultural
preservation and tourism economy are discussed. A review of literature concerning
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modeling human decision making in the field of water resources management is also
included. Finally, motivation for the presented research is explained.
Chapter 3 details the choosing of the specified study area, the coastal county of
Charleston, South Carolina. Context is provided concerning the area's economic and
cultural significance, as well as the community's ongoing struggles with nuisance
flooding and increasingly severe coastal hazards.
Chapter 4 outlines the methods, software, and data used to simulate rainfall-runoff
interactions in the Charleston Peninsula as well as a more focused model of the
peninsula's Market Street watershed. This chapter also explains the estimation and
application of the coalitional game theory solution concept, the Shapley value, to inform
GI placement in the Market Street watershed for the purpose of reducing flood-induced
building damages.
Chapter 5 contains model validation information, results concerning GI placement
scenarios and corresponding potential flood damage savings, cost efficiency tables, and
discussion on recommended planning strategies based on the combined flood simulation
and game theory results.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes research findings and provides suggestions for
future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 CLIMATE CHANGE AND COASTAL COMMUNITIES
Climate change has impacted human and natural systems, globally, at every level
of development. Changes in the hydrological cycle observed due to global warming over
the last several decades include increased atmospheric water vapor content, altered
precipitation patterns, intensity, and extremes, and changes in soil moisture (Bates et al.,
2008). The United States has experienced an increasing percentage of intense single-day
rain events between 1901 and 2014. Additionally, total annual precipitation has increased
by 0.5% per decade across all 48 contiguous states, and 0.2% per decade over land areas
worldwide (EPA, 2014). Much of our existing and aging water infrastructure is strained
by these changes, whose designs were based in past hydrological experiences and
stationarity assumptions (Bates et al., 2008; Milly et al., 2008; U.S. Global Change
Research Program, 2017). However, the consequent costs of heightened temperatures and
rising seas have not distributed their risks evenly and will continue to disproportionately
affect built and environmental systems in coastal areas.
The combined and exacerbated impacts of more intense storms and sea level rise
are particularly detrimental to coastal communities, threatening outdoor recreation reliant
on surrounding natural systems as well as regional economies based in agriculture,
fishing, and tourism (EPA, 2014; U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2017). As
global temperatures increase, the rising sea impacts storm surge, high tide levels, coastal
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erosion, and incites loss of crucial wetland areas, worsening effects of natural disasters
(NOAA, 2022). 17 of the 18 warmest years on record have occurred since 2001, bringing
with them over two thirds of the total hurricane damages recorded over the last century
(Gaul, 2019). Experts' concern with these issues may be less extreme if it weren't for
human propensity to settle around bodies of water; coastal areas constitute less than 10%
of the land in the contiguous United States, but house nearly 40% of the country's
population (NOAA, 2021). With an existing trillion-dollar coastal property market and
many forms of public infrastructure at stake, high tide flooding is expected to continue to
affect homes and businesses in these densely populated areas by overloading storm and
wastewater systems while stressing surrounding estuarine ecosystems (NOAA, 2022;
U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2017). As population growth, economic
development, and urbanization are expected to continue and compound existing coastal
community vulnerability, it is imperative that implemented adaptation and infrastructure
decisions are considered in the context of long-term sustainable development (IPCC,
2014).
2.2 TRADITIONAL AND GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE
The introduction of impermeable surfaces, such as concrete pavement and
roofing, which replace soils and vegetation that aid in mitigating runoff volumes through
infiltration and evapotranspiration processes following storm events, cause significant
variations in runoff volumes and flow patterns (Das, 2015). This is of additional concern
in highly urbanized and densely populated coastal areas, which, like all communities,
include vital means of transportation and business, which can be interrupted by both
rainfall and tide induced nuisance flooding. In the past, engineers and city planners have
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relied on traditional, or grey infrastructure methods, to move urban stormwater out of
built environments, by way of gutters, drains, pipes, and collection systems (EPA, 2021).
What each of these means of control have in common is a focus on conveying stormwater
elsewhere, often untreated and into local water bodies. As climate variations and land use
changes continue to alter existing hydrologic conditions, additional stormwater
infrastructure to reduce excess runoff will be needed to aid existing means of grey
infrastructure which may not be equipped to adequately handle these changes on their
own.
To meet this challenge, a case for Green Infrastructure (GI) should be made. The
Water Infrastructure Improvement Act defines GI as "the range of measures that use plant
or soil systems, permeable pavement or other permeable surfaces or substrates,
stormwater harvest and reuse, or landscaping to store, infiltrate, or evapotranspirate
stormwater and reduce flows to sewer systems or to surface waters" (Water Infrastructure
Improvement Act, 115 U.S.C. § 436, 2019). Low impact development (LID) strategies
fall under the umbrella term of GI and describe an approach to stormwater management
that mimics the natural processes within an environment to manage and treat stormwater
close to its source, rather than conveying it elsewhere (EPA, 2018). LID implementation
works to deter excess rainfall from common collection points through the creation,
restoration, and preservation of green spaces and natural landscape features that
effectively limit the amount of built and impermeable surfaces added to an area (Ellis et
al., 2014; EPA, 2018). There is a vast body of research which explores the effectiveness
of GI for urban runoff rate and volume reduction, be it through rainwater harvesting
(Ahiablame et al., 2013; Jones & Hunt, 2010), permeable pavements (Randall et al.,
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2020; Støvring et al., 2018; Zhang, Shouhong; Guo, 2014), bioretention cells (Davis,
2008; Wang et al., 2019), or green roofing (Bliss et al., 2009; William et al., 2016). These
strategies work in tandem with, reduce stress on, and expand the capacity of existing
stormwater infrastructure by intercepting rainfall before it reaches urban drainage
systems (Ahern, 2011).
LID strategies are versatile in that they can not only be applied to new
development projects, but redevelopment and retrofitting projects as well (Roseen et al.,
2011). Most are easily accessible to homeowners and businesses and relatively
affordable, particularly means of rainwater harvesting and bioretention in the form of rain
gardens. Additionally, GI implementation provides an opportunity to add both aesthetic
(Tupper, 2012) and monetary (Ichihara & Cohen, 2010; Voicu & Been, 2008) value to
outdoor spaces and properties. For these reasons, and their ability to bolster the
capabilities of existing and aged grey infrastructure, LID strategies have high potential to
increase flood resilience in urban coastal communities.
2.3 CULTURAL HERITAGE PRESERVATION IN FLOOD-PRONE AREAS
Coastal areas often offer a combination of history and natural landscapes that
cannot be experienced anywhere else. Visiting historic and cultural sites is one of the
most popular tourist activities today, and heritage tourism has been recognized as the
fastest growing niche market in the tourism industry (Baram, 2008; Hargrove, 2002).
However, many landmarks and cultural heritage sites are now at risk due to climate
change impacts including sea level rise, coastal erosion, increased flooding, and heavy
rain, threatening archaeological resources, historic buildings, and cultural landscapes
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while creating complex interactions within and between natural, cultural, economic, and
social systems (Cassar et al., 2007; Holtz et al., 2014).
In turn, the tourism sector has become increasingly impacted by climate change
and has much to lose by way of both economic and natural resources (Cassar et al.,
2007). Attractions allow coastal communities to generate seasonal employment
opportunities and contributions to the local economy. For example, the United States
coastal tourism and recreation sector, which includes scenic water tours, parks, beachgoing, marinas, and hotels and lodging, makes up nearly 75% of the employment of the
country’s entire marine economy (Office for Coastal Management, 2020).
Multiple studies have confirmed the effects of increasing environmental changes
and flooding events on tourist activities. In one case, a negative relationship was found to
exist between number of visitors and flooding patterns in Spain, citing fewer visitors to a
thermal bath complex following heightened water levels in a nearby reservoir (Ara et al.,
2019). Another reported direct flooding impacts on the tourism industry in Malaysia,
finding declines in both numbers and hotel revenue in response to destruction of natural,
cultural, and heritage attractions (Hamzah et al., 2012). Using parking revenue data,
(Hino et al., 2019) found decreased visits to historic downtown Annapolis, Maryland due
to frequent high-tide flooding. In another case, 45% of hotel reservations in Venice, Italy
were cancelled following a historic flood event in 2019 which inundated nearly 90% of
the city (Cerini, 2019; Insurance Journal, 2019).
The effects of flooding on historic sites are often overlooked, but can be
devastating not only to historic structures, but their surrounding landscape and contents
as well (Hamzah et al., 2012; Holický & Sýkora, 2010). These, coupled with the
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intangible value of heritage itself, are the irreplaceable character defining elements that
need to be protected for future generations to enjoy, which is necessary to maintain
tourism’s place in many local economies (Hargrove, 2002; Stovel, 1998; Wolch et al.,
2014). The main challenge in implementing traditional stormwater mitigation techniques
in culturally significant and visually impressive areas lies in the inability to make
alterations to sites or structures that can cause loss of or obscure their historic designation
or features (Holický & Sýkora, 2010). This is problematic as the literature that exists on
vulnerability assessments for historic sites due to flooding focuses mainly on the
structural integrity of historic buildings without putting emphasis on the surrounding
landscape and other natural features (Gandini, 2018; Promsaka et al., 2012; Wolch et al.,
2014).
It has been established that if coastal economies dependent on tourism are to
remain unaffected by the combined effects of climate change and urbanization, additional
flood protection is needed. Simultaneously, these areas must maintain their aesthetic
appeal while managing the highly unequal distribution of adverse climate change effects.
LID strategies, due to their aesthetic qualities, make them well-suited for historically
significant areas with flood vulnerabilities, particularly those containing historic
buildings and surrounding green spaces. However, choices about spending and placement
remain a complex water resources management problem.
2.4 WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND MODELING HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Increased flood frequency and associated risks affect decision making by
individuals and businesses as well as water resources planners and managers. Planners
must collaborate with numerous community institutions while ensuring that decisions
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take into consideration long-term impacts on future generations and fit into present
budget constraints as well as highly developed urban spaces (Ahern, 2011; Loucks &
Beek, 2017). There are plentiful studies which have aimed to inform LID placement and
design decisions using rainfall-runoff simulations in the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Stormwater Management Model (SWMM) (Bai et al., 2018; Kim et al.,
2018; Qin et al., 2013; Simpson, 2010; York et al., 2015; Zahmatkesh et al., 2014) as
well as a variety of studies which have coupled SWMM simulations with optimization
algorithms (Eckart et al., 2018; Ghodsi et al., 2020; Macro et al., 2019; Raei et al., 2019;
Tavakol-Davani et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2017). This category of study is suitable for
informing centralized decision-making surrounding GI but neglects the drivers of and
human behaviors behind decentralized GI decisions.
LIDs are a decentralized form of infrastructure, able to be procured and installed
by individual property owners, with or without financial incentives from governing
bodies. This accessibility is a tradeoff for smaller service area, therefore widespread
adoption through community participation is needed in order to see systemwide benefits
(Ahiablame & Shakya, 2016; Baptiste et al., 2015; Montalto et al., 2013; Ureta et al.,
2021). Multiple studies have attempted to identify community barriers to GI
participation, with findings ranging from household characteristics (Ureta et al., 2021),
lack of public understanding about individual roles in stormwater management (Chaffin
et al., 2016), lack of trust and communication between stakeholder groups (Van De
Meene et al., 2009), property restrictions (Coleman et al., 2018), and lack of direct
financial incentives (Carter & Fowler, 2008).
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It is the combination of these beliefs and barriers across communities which work
together to produce system-wide collective and emergent behavior. Agent-Based
Modeling (ABM) methods offer a means of simulating these diverse behaviors,
relationships, and interactions among individuals, or actors, within their environment
(Macal & North, 2010). Applications for water resources management are still relatively
limited (Berglund, 2015), but ABM has the potential to allow modelers to observe, plan
for, and understand the long- and short-term outcomes of ecological, environmental,
economic, and social changes, which are all important aspects of the water resource
system planning and management process (Loucks & Beek, 2017). ABM has been used
previously to investigate possible outcomes and emergent responses to various climate,
policy, flood, and subsidy scenarios (An et al., 2005; Manson, 2001; D. C. Parker et al.,
2003), some coupled with hydraulic models (Abebe et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2020; Dawson
et al., 2011; Hyun et al., 2019; Michaelis et al., 2020). Additional coastal climate change
adaptation literature which utilizes ABM are summarized in Table 3.1. While ABMs are
particularly suited to aid in the study of local-global interactions, effects of heterogeneity
on emergence, and decentralized decision-making (Bandini et al., 2009), there is a lack of
data on agents themselves, limiting reliability of parametrized human behaviors (Macal &
North, 2010; Michaelis et al., 2020; Patt & Siebenhüner, 2005; Yang et al., 2018).
Extensive data collection requirements and challenges in modeling both communications
and complex interactions among individuals makes this method of study a non-trivial task
(Niazi & Hussain, 2012) for water management researchers.
Game Theory analysis, not yet implemented to a great extent in the field of water
resources management, allows for the prediction of human behavior in response to
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Table 3.1: Coastal Adaptation Strategies and Associated Studies Which Utilize ABM
Adaptation
Type

Secondary
Categories

Land use
changes

Flood
proofing

Example Strategies

ABM Studies

Flood resistant
agriculture
Replacement of armored
with living shorelines
Adjusted land use
planning
Retrofitted building
Building and contents
elevation*
Elevation of low-lying
infrastructure
Green infrastructure*

Troost et al. 2012; Morgan
and Daigneault 2015; Jenkins
et al. 2017; Crick, Jenkins,
and Surminski 2018; Abebe
et al. 2019b

Accommodation
Evacuation
planning

Flood
forecasting
and
projection

Hard
structures

Protection
Coastal
management

Improved evacuation
routes*
Improved flood shelters
Flood hazard mapping
Flood warning systems
Flood insurance
Government subsidies*
Flood information
campaigns*

Seawalls
Dikes
Storm surge barriers

Beach and dune
nourishment
Artificial dunes
Removal of invasive and
restoration of native
species
Enhancement of coastal
vegetation
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Brown and Ferreira 2013;
Montalto et al. 2013; Haer et
al. 2017, 2020; Crick,
Jenkins, and Surminski 2018;
Tonn and Guikema 2018;
Yang et al. 2018; Abebe et
al. 2019b, 2020; Zhuo et al.
2019; Chandra-Putra and
Andrews 2020; Han et al.
2020; Michaelis et al. 2020
R. J. Dawson, Peppe, and
Wang 2011
Haer et al. 2017, 2020;
Jenkins et al. 2017; Karanci,
Berglund, and Overton 2017;
Crick, Jenkins, and
Surminski 2018; Tonn and
Guikema 2018; Yang et al.
2018; Zhuo et al. 2019;
Abebe et al. 2020; ChandraPutra and Andrews 2020;
Han et al. 2020
Tonn and Guikema 2018;
Abebe et al. 2019b; Zhuo et
al. 2019; Haer et al. 2020;
Han et al. 2020; Michaelis et
al. 2020
Karanci, Berglund, and
Overton 2017

Land
reclamation

Retreat
Climate
migration

Allow wetlands to
migrate inland
Shoreline setbacks
Deny development
approval in flood prone
areas*
Managed community
retreat
Selling property in flood
prone areas*

13

Crick, Jenkins, and
Surminski 2018; Abebe et al.
2019b

Berman et al. 2004; HassaniMahmooei and Parris 2012;
Jenkins et al. 2017; Karanci,
Berglund, and Overton 2017;
Tonn and Guikema 2018;
Chandra-Putra and Andrews
2020

conflict and omits the need for behavioral data as well as the modeling challenges
presented by agent-based modeling methods (Madani, 2010; Parrachino et al., 2006).
Predicted game theory outcomes often differ from those found using traditional
optimization methods, as they take into consideration and prioritize individual
stakeholder objectives rather than system objectives, and allow modelers to observe how
individual goals affect system outcomes and evolution (Madani, 2010). Game theory can
incorporate decision makers’ potential actions, preferences, and strategic choices in the
face of conflict, allowing researchers to predict individual decisions in differing
scenarios, give advice to relevant parties, and inform future decisions (Farooqui & Niazi,
2016) in planning, policy, and design conflicts (Madani, 2010). Cooperative game theory,
in which agents are able to work together and bargain with one another, offers solutions
to allocation problems which can serve as a basis for, for example, agreements among
parties dealing with cost sharing conflicts or benefits allocation following player
cooperation (Myerson, 1991; Parrachino et al., 2006). Applications of cooperative game
theory in water resources dilemmas include allocation of maintenance cost for a shared
irrigation system (Hamers et al., 2003), electricity and production cost from shared
hydroelectric power (Gately, 1974), pollution allowance (Kilgour et al., 1988), aquifer
resources (Just & Netanyahu, 2004), and water rights (Braden et al., 1991). However, the
use of Game Theory to consider socio-economic impacts of flood management and
stormwater management practice installation has not been well-established.
A recent study (William et al., 2017) used cooperative game theory to investigate
the impacts of various stormwater management policies to incentivize GI implementation
for community participation in bioretention cell installation in an urban watershed.
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Results provide insights concerning spatial bargaining power in the study area, with
analysis revealing which subbasins are adequately reimbursed in terms of decreased
stormwater pollutant loads versus the expenses they incurred for GI installation. Still,
there are no studies, to my knowledge, which leverage cooperative game theory concepts
in this manner to inform cost effective LID placement for the purpose of stormwater
capture and consequent local flood damage reduction.
2.5 RESEARCH MOTIVATION
Heavier precipitation events, sea level rise, and increasingly severe storm surge
are expected to cause lasting damage to existing coastal properties and infrastructure.
Aging means of traditional stormwater infrastructure in these areas are expected to not be
able to adequately handle these changes and would benefit by alleviated stress and
increased capacity by way of widespread GI installation. Planners, governing bodies, and
relevant stakeholders would greatly benefit from further knowledge surrounding
increasing community participation in stormwater management efforts, as well as means
of informed predictions for where LID projects will be most beneficial and cost-effective
in the long-term. For this reason, this research proposes the use of coalitional game
theory (CLT) analysis to inform LID placement, spending, and GI advocacy focus in
coastal Charleston, South Carolina. Results from this study will potentially provide
insights concerning spatial flood damage and flood reduction benefit information as well
as study subarea bargaining power, with analysis revealing areas in Charleston which
would be adequately reimbursed in terms of decreased flooding and economic damage
for the cost incurred for various GI installation scenarios.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY AREA: CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA
3.1 ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE
The City of Charleston, South Carolina, a major and scenic port along the
southeastern coast of the United States, is situated on an inlet of the Atlantic Ocean
formed by the confluence of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers (Charleston County, 2010). It
is South Carolina’s oldest city, home to a 1,750-acre historic district designated by the
National Register of Historic Places (Morris & Renken, 2020) and over 1,000 historic
buildings which line the city’s colorful and frequently crowded downtown streets
(Spanger-Siegfried et al., 2014). The city is an economic engine for the state, by way of
both trade and manufacturing, but the core of its revenue is reliant on an enduring
heritage tourism industry (Morris & Renken, 2020; Platt, 2020). Following an influx of
nearly 7 million visitors, over 2.5 million attraction attendees, and nearly $7.3 million in
economic impact, history and historic sites were deemed the Greater Charleston Area’s
greatest asset in 2018 (Office of Tourism Analysis, 2018). However, having experienced
drainage and flooding problems since its founding (City of Charleston, 2015), sea level
rise and increased flooding instances are significant threats to both Charleston’s lucrative
tourism economy and business community (Williams & Moore, 2020).
3.2 FLOOD VULNERABILITY
The City of Charleston is an economic engine and travel destination which is
facing an existential threat due to compound flooding (Peterson & Porter, 2020). The area
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is expected to face extensive flooding from high tides alone by 2030 (Spanger-Siegfried
et al., 2014). In the 1970s, Charleston experienced an average of two days of tidal
flooding per year, an average of more than two dozen days in 2014, and is predicted to
experience 180 days of flooding in 2045 (City of Charleston, 2015; Spanger-Siegfried et
al., 2014). Nuisance flooding incidence has increased due to compounding effects of sea
level rise, land subsidence, and urban development, and is worsening due to ongoing
population growth and approval for additional development projects (Morris & Renken,
2020). The city experienced an all-time record of 89 tidal floods in 2019, translating to a
flood event nearly every five days, following a previous record of 58 events in 2015
(Peterson & Porter, 2020). Tidal threshold exceedances show an upward trend since the
early 1920’s, and are expected to continue to increase (Figure 3.1) (NOAA & National
Weather Service, 2022). These ‘sunny day’ flood events, which occur even without
rainfall aiding in overwhelming the city’s aging stormwater drainage system, inhibit
tourists in historic downtown Charleston as well as the mobility of motor vehicles and
foot traffic alike, resulting in closed businesses, flooded homes, and damaged
infrastructure (Spanger-Siegfried et al., 2014). The city reported 80 instances of closed
roads due to flooded conditions between 2015 and the summer of 2021 in the Market
Street watershed alone (Figure 3.2) (City of Charleston, 2021). As sunny day flooding
instances increase, the city must also contend with increasingly severe storms and heavy
rains.
Currently, the most commonly used form of stormwater infrastructure in South
Carolina’s coastal zone is detention ponds (Vandiver & Hernandez, 2010). Out of
approximately 21,500 detention ponds in coastal South Carolina, over 3,700 of them are
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Figure 3.1: Charleston Harbor Tide Threshold Exceedances 1922-2021

Figure 3.2: Charleston Peninsula and Market Street Watershed Flood Induced Road
Closure Locations 2015-2021
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in Charleston County, and are largely located in residential areas (Cotti-Rausch et al.,
2019; Stormwater Ponds Research and Management Collaborative, 2014). The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) predicts up to a foot of sea level rise
for United States coastlines by 2050 and a minimum of two feet by 2100 (NOAA, 2022).
Detention ponds may be deemed ineffective once they are merged or submerged by this
change in sea level. My preliminary analysis provides that, from overlaying NOAA sea
level rise estimates (NOAA, 2019) with Charleston County’s existing ponds, an
estimated one-foot change in sea level will result in a loss of over 160 detention ponds,
nearly 40% of which are in Residential areas (Lawyer & Goharian, 2021, 2020). As an
example, Figure 3.3 illustrates at varying degrees of sea level rise inland ponds in
Charleston’s urban Mount Pleasant community which become ineffectual as a means of
stormwater capture. Figure 3.4 shows what percentages of total stormwater ponds on
residential and commercial developments are expected to be affected at different sea
levels, estimating a loss of nearly 5% residential and 2% commercial ponds by 2050 and
over 12% residential and 4% commercial ponds by 2100. Even without these predicted
losses, it is recommended that ponds be coupled with other best management practices
(BMP), such as LID strategies, to enhance removal and retention of stormwater
(Vandiver & Hernandez, 2010).
The United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides a
National Risk Index, which indicates the potential of a community to suffer negative
impacts as a result of a natural hazard based on the following equation (FEMA, 2022):
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =

𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
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The study area, part of the Old Historic District, lies predominantly in Census tract
45019005100 which has a Risk Index rating of Relatively High and lies within the top
14% of counties in the country, and the top 6% of counties in the state of South Carolina
(Figure 3.5). Although the area has a Relatively low Social Vulnerability score and a
Very High Community Resilience score, it has a Relatively High Expected Annual Loss
score, within the top 9% for the country, totaling an expected $1.2 billion.
Coastal areas also face a slew of additional engineering challenges, from high and
tidally influenced groundwater tables and flat terrain to poorly draining soils. South
Carolina’s Coastal Plain has the second highest average annual rainfall in the United
States, averaging 50 to 52 inches per year (Ellis et al., 2014; South Carolina Climatology
Office, 2013). The City of Charleston’s drainage system, some of which dates back to the
1800s, struggles to contend with precipitation as is, as many of the system’s outfalls are
tidally influenced. When the tide is high, the stormwater collection system has inadequate
room for stormwater runoff, causing lengthy drainage times and unwanted surface
ponding (Figure 3.6) (Charleston County, 1999). In addition to higher-than-average
rainfall, coastal environments are vulnerable to storm surge damage and tropical storms,
hurricanes, and other coastal hazards. The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for
the United States (SHELDUS) reported an aggregated property damage cost of nearly
$54 billion for Charleston County between 2000 and 2019, nearly 85% of which was
reportedly caused by hurricane, tropical storm, and flooding events, even though these
categories accounted for only 32% of the total hazard events experienced in that time
frame (Center for Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 2020). One of these
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Figure 3.5: FEMA National Risk Index Map for Charleston Peninsula (FEMA, 2022)

Figure 3.6: Depiction of Low and Hide Tide Effects on Stormwater
Drainage (Charleston County, 1999)
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events was the historic South Carolina flood, also referred to as the infamous '1,000-year
flood', which occurred over the course of five days in early October of 2015 (Figure 3.7)
(City of Charleston, 2015; Weather Underground, 2015). Widespread, heavy rainfall
flooded central and coastal areas of the state, with many locations recording rainfall rates
as high as 2 inches per hour, costing an estimated $1.5 billion in damages (NOAA, 2016).
The City of Charleston experienced both extreme rainfall and tide elevations and was hit
with a record-breaking 11.5 inches of rain in 24 hours on October 3rd, and more than 23
inches of rain over the course of the whole event (City of Charleston, 2015; Weather
Underground, 2015). This event will serve as the case study for this research to
investigate the ability of widespread, decentralized GI installation to reduce flood damage
costs in urban coastal environments.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS
4.1 STORM WATER MANAGEMENT MODELING
The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Storm Water
Management Model (SWMM) is a widely implemented dynamic rainfall-runoff
simulation model which allows the user to monitor both runoff quality and quantity over
single and continuous events (USEPA & Rossman, 2015). Study areas are divided into
smaller subcatchments with specified properties, including pervious and impervious
fractions, depression storage depths, surface slopes, and roughness values. Overland flow
can be routed between these subcatchments or through drainage system inlets connected
to any variety of pipes, channels, storage units, and diversion structures. SWMM
accounts for a number of hydrologic processes, including but not limited to surface water
evaporation, time-varying rainfall, groundwater and drainage system interactions, and
infiltration (Figure 4.1). Common applications of this software include drainage system
component sizing for flood control, sizing of flood control detention facilities, studying
best management practice (BMP) effectiveness on pollutant load reduction, and
examining rainfall and runoff capture capabilities of low impact development (LID)
strategies.
Developed by Computational Hydraulics International (CHI), Personal Computer
Storm Water Management Model (PCSWMM) (CHI, 2020) is a spatial decision support
system (CHI, 2022c) which enhances EPA SWMM software use by offering, among
25

Figure 4.1: SWMM Operations (Diagram excludes pollutant processes)
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other features, a graphical interface, a comprehensive Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) toolset, integrated 1D-2D modeling, automated sensitivity, calibration and error
analysis, and output visualization and reporting (CHI, 2022b). All models created for this
research were configured in PCSWMM in accordance with requirements and suggestions
within the Storm Water Management Model User’s Manual Version 5.1 (USEPA &
Rossman, 2015).
4.1.1 Configuring the Charleston Peninsula Model in PCSWMM
The following paragraphs describe parameter and input sources for a 1D model in
PCSWMM containing rainfall, runoff, evaporation, and infiltration processes. The model
runs using a 15-minute time step for the total 120-hour duration, starting analysis at time
0:00:00 October 1, 2015, and ending at 0:00:00 October 6, 2015, to allow for flood
analysis during the historic flood events which took place across much of the state of
South Carolina (Figure 3.7).
Charleston’s peninsula, a significant portion of which makes up an area coined
the Old Historic District, consists of 43 watersheds. The watershed boundary shapefile
and corresponding attributes used were obtained from the City of Charleston’s GIS
Division Open Data (City of Charleston, 2021) and land cover information was obtained
from the National Land Cover Database (NLCD) (Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics
Consortium, 2011) (Figure 4.2). Raster data was imported to ArcMap v. 10.8.1 (ESRI,
2020) and a weighted average of impervious cover percentages per land use classification
was used to determine the impervious cover per basin to be input in PCSWMM. Average
surface slope per basin was also determined in ArcMap using a 3-meter National
Elevation Dataset to be input in PCSWMM (USDA & NRCS, 2017) (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.2: National Land Cover Database Raster of the Charleston
Peninsula with Watershed Boundaries

Figure 4.3: 3-Meter DEM of the Charleston
Peninsula with Watershed Boundaries
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All impervious and pervious areas were assigned depression storage values of 1.25mm
and 2.5mm, the values corresponding to impervious surfaces and lawns, respectively
(ASCE, 1992). Additionally, every basin maintains the default software assumption that
25% of the impervious area per basin has zero depression storage.
All impervious and pervious areas were assigned Manning’s roughness
coefficients for overland flow of 0.012 and 0.15, the values corresponding to smooth
concrete and grass, respectively (CHI, 2022a). Conduits, according to the drainage map,
were assigned Manning’s roughness coefficients of 0.012 or 0.015 for reinforced
concrete or brick, respectively (Chow, 1959). The Manning formula, which estimates
mean liquid velocity in open channels, is as follows,
𝑉=

1 2 1
𝑅3𝑆 2
𝑛

where V is mean flow velocity in meters per second, n is Manning’s roughness
coefficient, R is the hydraulic radius of the flow channel, and S is energy line slope.
The Modified Green-Ampt method was selected as the infiltration model for this
project, and the corresponding equation is shown below (Mein，R.G & Larson, 1973;
Morbidelli et al., 2018),
𝐹 − 𝜓𝑎𝑣 (𝜃𝑠 − 𝜃𝑖 )
𝐹 = 𝐹𝑝 − 𝜓𝑎𝑣 (𝜃𝑠 − 𝜃𝑖 )𝑙𝑛 [
] + 𝐾𝑠 (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑝 )
𝐹𝑝 − 𝜓𝑎𝑣 (𝜃𝑠 − 𝜃𝑖 )
where F denotes the cumulative depth of infiltrated water, av is the capillary head at the
wetting front, r is the rainfall rate,  is the volumetric water content, for which i and s
indicate initial and saturation quantities, K is the hydraulic conductivity of the soil, and 𝑡
and tp denote time and time to ponding, respectively. To determine parameters required
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for PCSWMM’s infiltration calculations, a soil map of the Charleston Peninsula
(Bonsteel & Carr, 1904) was used to determine the approximate soil type distribution for
each basin (Figure 4.4). This information was then used to assign corresponding
hydraulic conductivity, suction head, and initial soil moisture deficit inputs for PCWMM
per basin (Rawls et al., 1983). Groundwater processes and interactions are not
considered.
Dynamic wave routing was selected as the model’s flow routing method, which
utilizes the Saint-Venant equations, which consist of Continuity and Momentum
equations for one-dimensional flow (Chow et al., 1988). The Continuity equation states
that control volume inflows and outflows are equivalent to change in control volume, and
is presented in the following equation,
𝜕𝑄 𝜕𝐴
+
=0
𝜕𝑥 𝜕𝑡
where Q represents flow rate, x is conduit or channel length, A is the cross-sectional area
of the conduit or channel, and t is time. The Momentum equation specifies that the sum
of a flow’s local acceleration, convective acceleration, and pressure force is equal to the
sum of gravity force and friction force, and is presented in the following equation,
1 𝜕𝑄 1 𝜕 𝑄 2
𝜕𝑦
+
( )+𝑔
− 𝑔(𝑆𝑜 − 𝑆𝑓 ) = 0
𝐴 𝜕𝑡 𝐴 𝜕𝑥 𝐴
𝜕𝑥
where So and Sf represent conduit slope and friction slope, respectively.
To simulate the historic rainfall events over the Carolinas in October 2015,
evaporation, rainfall, and tidal data were obtained. Daily evaporation depth values were
input in PCSWMM for the duration of the storm event (Climate Engine, 2021). Rainfall
data was obtained in the form of hourly precipitation for the specified simulation
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Figure 4.4: 1904 Soil Map of the Charleston Peninsula (Bonsteel & Carr, 1904)
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date range from the Charleston International Airport Station (Weather Underground,
2015). This rainfall time series was assigned to each of the peninsula basins’ rain gages.
Corresponding water level data was obtained from the Charleston Cooper River Entrance
Station and assigned to each of the peninsula basins’ outfalls to account for backwater
flows when applicable (NOAA, 2015).
Finally, a reduced version of the peninsula’s existing drainage system was
implemented. Using a map of the drainage system (Howe, 1950) which includes handwritten specifications for conduit location, sizing, shape, direction of flow, and material,
conduits were manually drawn in PCSWMM and allocated their corresponding
specifications (Figure 4.5). Junctions were drawn according to street intersections and
locations where conduit flow was shown to meet and disperse to connected conduits in
conflicting directions. Junction rim elevations were set equal to their respective location’s
ground elevation, and junction invert elevations were calculated by subtracting each
junction’s corresponding channel diameter and an assumed two feet of freeboard.
Ponding at junctions was not considered. Outfalls were placed according to their location
on the drainage map and assumed to empty into the peninsula’s surrounding water
bodies. Rather than transposing the entire drainage system, each basin has an outfall and
two or fewer connected conduits, usually the largest in the basin, which serve as the
collection areas for other smaller conduits in each basin. The innermost node connected
to each of these outfalls in each basin is assumed to be each basin’s respective outlet, or
each basin’s main runoff collection node. The described drainage system created in
PCSWMM is shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.5: 1950 Drainage Map of the Charleston Peninsula (Howe, 1950)
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Figure 4.6: Charleston Peninsula Drainage System in PCSWMM
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4.1.2 Configuring the Market Street Basin in PCSWMM
To allow for a more concentrated analysis of GI and rainfall-runoff interactions,
the study area within PCSWMM was reduced to the Market Street basin only, an area
which experiences high tourist visitation and frequent nuisance flooding. To create the
multiple players needed for cooperative game theory analysis, the Market Street basin
was divided further into five hypothetical subbasins (Figure 4.7). The division was made
based on the location of Market Street itself as well as zoning information provided by
the City of Charleston (City of Charleston, 2021) (Figure 4.8). The way the subbasin
boundaries have been drawn, most of Market Street is contained to one subbasin and each
subbasin has a unique distribution of building types provided by the zoning data. The
building types within the basins are limited to Residential, Commercial, and Industrial.
For the purposes of this study, the latter two categories have been combined and will be
referred to as Commercial buildings, or Businesses, henceforth. All Residential type
buildings are assumed to be single-family households, and the terms Residential building
and Household will be used interchangeably.
While some PCSWMM parameters remained the same as described for the
Charleston Peninsula model, such as Manning’s roughness coefficients, soil types and
infiltration parameters, depression storage depths, and water level and rainfall time series,
the following were recalibrated for the Market Street Basin model. Impervious and
pervious percentages for each subbasin were determined using the previously utilized
NLCD raster data. Average slope for each subbasin was calculated in ArcMap, this time
using a 1-meter LiDAR Elevation Dataset (USDA & NRCS, 2019) (Figure 4.9). Finally,
using the previously referenced peninsula drainage map, the drainage system for the
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Figure 4.7: Market Street Subbasin Designations

Figure 4.8: City of Charleston Zoning Designations with Watershed Boundaries
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Figure 4.9: 1-Meter LiDAR Elevation Map of the Market Street
Basin with Subbasin Boundaries
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Market Street Basin was replicated in detail in PCSWMM to the fullest extent possible.
This model is shown in Figure 4.10, Market Street Basin Drainage System in PCSWMM.
4.2 COALITIONAL GAME THEORY AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
Game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) is a means of decision
analysis which allows us to model conflict, cooperation, and communication between two
or more individuals whose decisions affect each other’s welfare (Farooqui & Niazi, 2016;
Myerson, 1991). Any situation involving two or more players can be classified as a game,
where players are assumed to be 1) rational, in that they make self-interested decisions
which maximize some expected game payoff measured by some utility, and 2) intelligent,
in that the player knows everything about the game the modeler knows and can make any
inferences about the game the modeler can make (Myerson, 1991). A game with finite
players can be represented as a matrix, displaying player strategies, payoffs, and possible
combinations therein. In strategic, or normal form, game  is represented by the
following equation,
Γ = (𝑁, (𝐶𝑖 )𝑖𝜖𝑁 , (𝑢𝑖 )𝑖𝜖𝑁 )
where N is a nonempty set of game players, and each player i has a set of available
strategies, Ci. The strategy profile describes possible strategy combinations that game
players may choose, and C represents the set of all possible strategy profiles in the
following form:
𝐶=


𝐶
𝑗𝜖𝑁 𝑗
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Figure 4.10: Market Street Basin Drainage System in PCSWM

For any strategy profile within this set C where 𝑐 = (𝑐𝑗 )𝑗𝜖𝑁 , where c is the implemented
strategy combination, the number ui(c) represents the expected utility payoff for player i.
(Myerson, 1991).
There are numerous game distinctions, but the most common are non-cooperative
and cooperative. Intuitively, non-cooperative games involve players who compete and
make independent decisions whereas cooperative games involve players who are able to
make collective decisions, negotiate, and allocate the benefits of doing so (Madani,
2010). Cooperative games with three or more players must employ a theory of coalitional
analysis in order to account for the formation of possible multiplayer coalitions
(Myerson, 1991).
In coalitional game theory (CGT), game analysis takes into consideration that
cooperative subsets, or coalitions, may form within the group of players in their entirety,
referred to as the grand coalition (Myerson, 1991). CGT allows for game theorists to
model the capabilities of groups of individuals rather than the individuals themselves
(Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008). A central solution concept in CGT, the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953), associates a unique game payoff value to each coalition member (Hart,
2008). In other terms, a player’s Shapley value is the player’s average marginal
contribution (AMC) to a game payout, weighted and summed over all possible player
combinations (Molnar, 2022; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008). In this sense, it is a
useful measure of individual players’ power in a coalitional game (Myerson, 1991). It is
also used as a measure of fairness when allocating game payouts, according to symmetry,
dummy player, and additivity axioms (Myerson, 1991; Shapley, 1953; Shoham &
Leyton-Brown, 2008). The Shapley value of player i, i, in game (N, v), can be calculated
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using the following equation, in which N represents the grand coalition, or set of all
players, S is a given coalition, and v(S) is the contribution of coalition S:
𝜙𝑖 (𝑁, 𝑣) =

1
∑ |𝑆|! (|𝑁| − |𝑆| − 1)! [𝑣(𝑆 ∪ {𝑖}) − 𝑣(𝑆)]
|𝑁|!
𝑆𝑁\{𝑖}

Included in the above equation, characteristic function v assigns a number value v(S), or
worth, to every coalition S. This is possible due to the Shapley value concept’s
underlying assumption of the existence of transferable utility. This assumption states that
game players may freely transfer units of commodity, usually in the form of money,
among themselves. With each unit of commodity a player gains, their payoff increases
(Myerson, 1991). The following section explains how these concepts are applied to
stormwater management to inform GI spending and planning decisions.
4.2.1 Game Design and Implementation
This research seeks to employ the CGT solution concept of the Shapley value to
inform GI allocation across the five Market Street watershed subbasins by observing total
watershed flood damage cost reductions following the historic 2015 flood under different
installation scenarios. Four unique games and two variations of one of these games were
designed and implemented for the Market Street watershed model which is executed in
PCSWMM.
Subbasin buildings have been categorized according to the previously presented
zoning data and have been limited to either Residential (Household) or Commercial
(Business) identifiers. Building counts and areas were calculated using ArcMap (City of
Charleston, 2021). Additionally, GI types considered in the presented games are limited
to rooftop-connected rain barrels and rain cisterns. In all presented games it is assumed
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that a maximum of one rain barrel may be installed per Residential building and a
maximum of one rain cistern may be installed per Commercial building. As PCSWMM
does not allow users to assign LIDs to specific buildings, impervious area treated in each
basin was calculated using the average size of each building type per subbasin. For
example, the impervious area treated in Subbasin B by two cisterns is assumed to be
equal to two times the average area of Commercial buildings in Subbasin B. Employed
rainwater harvesting costs and design specification are shown in Table 4.1.
Unique games are proposed to observe the effects of varying hypothetical
spending amounts, GI grants, impervious area treatment minimums, and minimum
rainwater storage requirements (Table 4.2). Each game was simulated with the following
conditions:
•

Barrels and cisterns have no underdrains, so the barrels and cisterns
employed only fill one time over the course of the simulation.

•

Barrels and cisterns have a 12-hour drain delay. In PCSWMM, drain
delays occur after rainfall has ceased for 12 hours.

For the storm event used in this study, barrels and cisterns drained twice over the
course of the simulation; once at hour 40, at approximately 4pm on October 3rd, and
again at hour 110, at approximately 2pm on October 5th. When applicable, drains were
assigned a 2-inch diameter, an offset height of 6-inches, and drain coefficients were
calculated according SWMM manual procedures (USEPA & Rossman, 2015). Each
game was implemented in PCSWMM using the software’s LID Usage Editor to place
LIDs according to the game descriptions. An n player coalitional game produces
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Table 4.1: Rain Barrel and Cistern Design Specifications and Costs
Rain Barrel
Building Type
Residential
Size (gal)
60
Cost (USD)
115
Unit Area (sqm) 0.29
Unit Height (m) 0.9

Rain Cistern A
Commercial
2,000
1,680
4.1
2.4

Rain Cistern B
Commercial
5,000
4,300
5.3
3.9

Table 4.2: Games Executed in PCSWMM and Game Specifications
Scenario Name Game Specifications
1. Maxed
Every Residential building has one 60-gallon rain barrel, and every
Commercial building has one 2,000-gallon cistern. Subbasin total
costs and quantities vary. This serves as the maximum rainwater
harvesting scenario within user-set barrel size and building type
restrictions.
2. Equal
Each subbasin has 14 identical 2,000-gallon cisterns and each
Storage
subbasin has a total cistern cost of $23,520. A quantity of 14 was
selected because it is the number of Commercial buildings in the
subbasin with the fewest Commercial buildings. This serves as an
identical spending and rainwater storage scenario across all
subbasins.
3. 20%
Each subbasin treats a minimum of and as close to 20% of its
Impervious
impervious area as possible using only 2,000-gallon cisterns.
Area Treated
Subbasin total costs and quantities vary. This serves as a feasibility
(IAT)
test for GI rebate programs which only consider treated area
requirements.
4. Maxed,
Maxed (Game 1) scenario funding for Subbasin A (cisterns only) is
5,000-gallon
transferred to Subbasin E and is added to Subbasin E’s existing
Cisterns in
Maxed scenario funding. With this additional funding, Subbasin E
Subbasin E
replaces its 16 2,000-gallon cisterns with 16 5,000-gallon cisterns.
This serves as a suggested scenario.
5. Maxed,
Same as Maxed (Game 1) scenario, but subbasins are reimbursed
Rebate A
$5,000 for every 10% of impervious area treated.
6. Maxed,
Same as Maxed (Game 1) scenario, but subbasins are reimbursed
Rebate B
$7,000 for every 15% of impervious area treated.
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2n-1 possible player combinations, therefore each game required 31 model runs in
PCSWMM, each simulating different subbasin combinations of LID installation.
PCSWMM produced the total flood volumes resulting from each scenario, which were
used to calculate total flood damage costs for each subbasin and the whole Market Street
watershed system. This process is discussed in detail in Section 4.3.
In terms of the Shapley solution concept, the contribution value of each subbasin
coalition, v(S), is represented by each subbasin’s capacity to reduce flood damage cost for
the entire Market Street watershed. Coalition S can consist of any combination of players,
represented by the five Market Street subbasins. These subbasins have been designated
identifiers A through E (Figure 4.7). If a subbasin is in a coalition, it is assumed to have
participated in some form of LID implementation. For example, coalition A describes a
scenario in which Subbasin A installed LIDs according to game rules, and Subbasins B,
C, D, and E did not. Hence, the Shapley value of Subbasin A, A, represents the average
marginal contribution (AMC) of Subbasin A to the total system flood damage cost
reduction after considering its contribution to the system in every possible coalition
combination. The grand coalition will henceforth refer to coalition ABCDE, the player
combination in which all subbasins participate in LID installation, and alternately, the
empty set describes the baseline scenario in which none of the players partake in LID
installation.
The Shapley value serves as a metric of power for each subbasin, illustrating
which subbasins contribute most to overall system flood damage reduction, informing
future planning decisions, either in terms of where GI advocacy efforts should be
focused, incentives offered, or LID projects installed. Additionally, in running every
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combination of subbasin participation in GI installation, it is possible to compare cost
effectiveness for each subbasin by observing GI cost per basin and individual subbasin
flood damage cost reductions.
4.3 FLOOD DAMAGE COST CALCULATIONS
Shapley values were calculated using building flood damage cost reductions as a
metric to inform LID placement decisions. These costs were estimated using PCSWMM
Total Flood Volume outputs and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
HAZUS Flood Model Depth-Damage Curves (FEMA, 2021) to estimate Residential and
Commercial building total repair costs (TRC) per subbasin and then summing them for
the Market Street watershed (Figure 4.11). To establish the empty coalition TRC, or the
baseline TRC, Total Flood Volume for all junctions in each Market Street subbasin were
summed to determine the total flood volume with no LIDs in place. To approximate
subbasin flood depths, the following equation was used:
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 =

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑖) − 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠(𝑖)

Once subbasin flood depths were established, all buildings within each subbasin
were assumed to experience a uniform level of flooding. Residential TRCs per subbasin
were calculated by multiplying the total Residential building area per subbasin by the
corresponding HAZUS Depth-Damage Curve (DDC) percent damage value assigned to
Single Family Household, Luxury, No Basement homes and the HAZUS designated
repair cost per flooded square foot (Table 4.3). Commercial building TRCs were
calculated following the same procedure, using HAZUS DDC values and repair costs for
Entertainment and Recreation buildings. These damages were then summed for each
subbasin and ultimately the entire Market Street Basin to find TRC for the system. This
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Table 4.3: HAZUS Repair Costs per Square Foot
Building
Category
Residential
Commercial

HAZUS Building Type
Single-Family Household, Luxury, No
Basement
Entertainment and Recreation

Repair Cost per Square
Foot (USD)
187.14
195.68

FEMA's HAZUS Depth Damage Curves
100
90
80

% Damage

70

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Depth (ft)
Single Family Household: Luxury, No Basement
Commercial Buildings: Entertainment & Recreation
Figure 4.11: FEMA’s HAZUS Depth-Damage Curves for Specified Residential and
Commercial Building Type
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procedure is summarized in the following equation:
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑅𝐶
= ∑(𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑖) ∗

𝐷𝐷𝐶 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
100

∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑖) ∗

𝐷𝐷𝐶 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
100

∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 )
This process was repeated for every coalition combination for every game scenario. To
calculate subbasin TRC reduction for each of these instances, each TRC for every
coalition combination for every game was subtracted from the baseline TRC. These
values were used to calculate subbasin Shapley values for each game.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 MODEL VALIDATION
The 1D Charleston Peninsula model configured in PCSWMM, later used to
develop the PCSWMM Market Street watershed model, was validated by comparing flow
rate results for a segment of the peninsula’s drainage network to those achieved in a fully
coupled compound flood Interconnected Channel and Pond Routing (ICPR) model for
the Charleston peninsula under identical rainfall and tide conditions (Tanim & Goharian,
in review). The ICPR is has been calibrated and validated based on historical data and
flood information for the Charleston peninsula, and thus, was used as a benchmark to
validate the PCSWMM model presented in this study.
ICPR employs a triangulated irregular network that preserves complex land use
features and basin hydrology at very fine temporal and spatial scales, whose drainage
network components include tidal creeks, tidal channels, wetlands, underground sewer
networks, and detention ponds. The Charleston ICPR model employed 0.5-meter DEM
and Digital Surface Model (DSM) data to account for overland flow representation and
building layout. ICPR simulates compound flooding and was validated using South
Carolina Department of Transportation flood induced road closure data. Model efficiency
comparing this data with the ICPR model’s detected road closure locations is 98.35% for
the historic South Carolina flood event and 100% for a nuisance tidal flooding event,
further validated by United States Geological Survey high water mark data.
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The Charleston peninsula model configured in PCSWMM was validated by
comparing flow rate results for the Market Street watershed and conduit discharges to
those obtained by the peninsula model built in ICPR. The ICPR model is used as a
benchmark as there is no water level, discharge, or velocity information available for
Charleston, including the Market Street watershed. Conduit location is shown in Figure
5.1, and flow rate comparisons over the course of the 2015 South Carolina historic flood
event are shown in Figure 5.2. In general, the flow rate is very similar to the ICPR model.
However, the main differences which occur largely at the beginning of the run are due to
1) ICPR’s distributed modeling of hydrological processes as well as 2D surface water
modeling, whereas PCSWMM is essentially a lump and 1D hydrological model, thus
model parameters are spatially and temporally constant over the run time, and 2) ICPR
models the whole system, while the PCSWMM has static boundary conditions. Thus,
water cannot leave the system and enter other watersheds and instead discharges to the
sea, as a result causing all runoff to drain to the limited number of pipes. Moreover,
PCSWMM Charleston peninsula simulations reported a runoff continuity error of 0.43%
and -0.23% respectively and Market Street watershed simulations reported a runoff
continuity error of -0.66% and -0.3% respectively. Thus, the PCSWMM is capable of
simulating flood scenarios, in particular the historic 2015 flood for the Charleston
peninsula and Market Street watershed as it presents very similar results to the
benchmark model.
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Figure 5.1: Conduit Used for ICPR Flow Rate Comparison and PCSWMM Model
Validation

PCSWMM and ICPR Conduit Flow Rate Comparison
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of ICPR and PCSWMM Market Street Conduit Flow Rate for
Historic 2015 South Carolina Flood Event
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5.2 BASELINE RESULTS
5.2.1 Subbasin Characteristics
Characteristics of each of the Market Street subbasins related to area and building
density are summarized in Table 5.1 and Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. Building counts and
areas per subbasin are listed in Table 5.2 and are illustrated in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. A map
of Residential and Commercial buildings is provided in Figure 5.8. NLCD land cover
distributions are summarized in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.9. Developed land cover, in terms
of impervious area covered by buildings and edge of pavement (EOP) (City of
Charleston, 2021) are listed in Table 5.4 and illustrated in Figures 5.10 and 5.11. Figure
12 provides a map of buildings and EOP cover. This information was required to create
game theory games which met the physical restraints of each subbasin, as well as to
calculate potential treated area in PCSWMM for each subbasin under different LID
conditions. All subbasin properties provided in this section will lend physical context to
and be discussed alongside Shapley value results.
5.2.2 Baseline Total Repair Cost
Total Repair Cost (TRC) for the baseline scenario, the empty set in each
coalitional game in which no LIDs have been in installed in any subbasins, was estimated
using the described flood damage cost calculation methods described in section 4.3 and
rounding up to the nearest dollar. The TRC for the baseline scenario is estimated to be
$10,357,415. Results for the baseline scenario run in PCSWMM, shown in Figures 5.13
and 5.14, indicate that flood volume was not distributed evenly across the subbasins, as
Subbasin C accounted for 35% of the total volume, followed by 30% in Subbasin E, and
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Table 5.1: Area and Building Distributions for Market Street Watershed Subbasins
Subbasin % Area of Market
Street Watershed
A
23
B
20
C
18
D
22
E
16

% Total Buildings in
Market Street Watershed
42
17
11
18
13

% Building Area in
Market Street Watershed
24
24
19
17
16

Table 5.2: Number and Area per Building Type per Market Street Subbasin
Subbasin Total
Residential
Buildings
A
27
B
4
C
0
D
8
E
0

Total Residential
Building Area
(sqm)
5,920
1,420
0
2,819
0

Total
Commercial
Buildings
25
17
14
14
16

Total Commercial
Building Area
(sqm)
27,958
33,219
27,078
20,882
22,689

Table 5.3: Distribution of NLCD Land Cover Types per Market Street Watershed
Subbasin
Subbasin
A
B
C
D
E

Developed, High
Intensity
50.6
58.0
80.9
50.0
88.0

Developed,
Medium Intensity
49.4
42.0
19.1
47.4
12.0
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Developed, Low
Intensity
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.6
0.0

Table 5.4: Developed Land Cover Type Distribution per Market Street Watershed
Subbasin
Subbasin
A
B
C
D
E

% Impervious
Area
89.6
91.2
96.0
88.7
97.5

% Impervious Area Consisting of:
Buildings
EOP
48
39
57
41
47
41
36
48
43
40

16%
23%

22%
20%

18%

A

B

C

D

E

Figure 5.3: Distribution of Total Market Street
Watershed Area per Subbasin
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of Total Market Street
Watershed Buildings per Subbasin
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of Total Market Street
Watershed Building Area per Subbasin
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of Building Number and Type per
Market Street Watershed Subbasin
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of Building Area and Building Type per
Market Street Watershed Subbasin

55

Figure 5.8: Map of Residential and Commercial Buildings per Market
Street Subbasin
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Figure 5.9: NLCD Land Cover Distribution per Market Street
Watershed Subbasin
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Figure 5.10: Impervious and Pervious Area Distribution per
Market Street Watershed Subbasin
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Figure 5.11: Developed Land Cover Distribution per Market Street
Watershed Subbasin
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Figure 5.12: Map of Market Street Watershed Building and Edge of
Pavement Cover
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Figure 5.13: Baseline (Empty Set) Subbasin Flood
Volume Distribution

58

19%

20%

15%

20%

26%

A

B

C

D

E

Figure 5.14: Baseline (Empty Set) Subbasin Flood
Damage Cost Distribution
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17%, 9%, and 8% in Subbasins D, A, and B, respectively. Thus, Subbasin C bore the
highest flood damage cost, accounting for 26% of the TRC, followed by Subbasin B and
E accounting for 20% each, Subbasin A for 19%, and Subbasin D for 15%. Differences in
shares of flood volume versus flood damage cost are the result of different land use types
as well as variation in number and type of buildings in each subbasin. 93% of the
watershed TRC is attributed to Commercial building costs, mostly attributed to Subbasins
C and E, as these subbasins had the highest flood volumes. Neither subbasin contains
Residential buildings, and the utilized HAZUS Commercial repair cost per square foot
exceeds that of Residential buildings. TRC reductions will be calculated for all game
coalition combinations by subtracting each coalition’s TRC from the baseline TRC and
will be used to measure subbasin Shapley values.
5.3 GAME ANALYSIS: SHAPLEY VALUE AND COST COMPARISONS
Shapley values for each developed game, previously described in Table 4.2, will
be presented in this section. In the first game scenario, “Maxed”, all Households install
one 60-gallon barrel, and all Businesses install one 2,000-gallon cistern. Subbasins have
varying storage capacities and LID costs. Number and percentage of participating
players, total GI cost, and impervious area treated (IAT) as input in PCSWMM’s LID
Usage Editor will be provided for each game and are shown for this scenario in Table 5.5.
Shapley value results and total spending are presented for the no underdrain and 12-hour
drain delay Maxed scenarios in Figure 5.15. Coalition flood damage cost reductions, or
TRC savings, per scenario are shown in Figure 5.16. Cost effectiveness, shown as TRC
savings per GI dollar spent, henceforth referred to as the spent-saved ratio (SSR), are
shown for both scenarios in Figure 5.17. In the no underdrains scenario, Subbasin E has
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Table 5.5: Game 1: Maxed, LID Quantities, Costs, and IAT
Subbasin Households with LIDs
Number % of Total
A
27
100%
B
4
100%
C
D
8
100%
E
-

Businesses with LIDs
Number % of Total
25
100%
17
100%
14
100%
14
100%
16
100%

IAT (%) GI Cost (USD)
48.5
57.0
47.2
36.6
43.2

$50,000.00
$45,000.00

3000

$40,000.00

Shapley Value

2500

$35,000.00
$30,000.00

2000

$25,000.00
1500

$20,000.00
$15,000.00

1000

$10,000.00
500

$5,000.00
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Figure 5.15: Game 1: Maxed Scenario, Subbasin Shapley Values and Total GI Costs
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GI Cost per Subbasin (USD)

3500

$45,105
$29,020
$23,520
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$26,880

Figure 5.16: Game 1: Maxed Scenario Coalition TRC
Reductions
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Figure 5.17: Game 1: Maxed Scenario Coalition GI Dollars Spent per
TRC Dollars Saved
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the highest Shapley value, and therefore the highest AMC of all subbasins to watershed
TRC savings, while also having the third lowest GI cost. Subbasin A has the second
highest Shapley value but a significantly higher cost, nearly double that of Subbasin E, as
it has the highest number of both Residential and Commercial buildings, and
consequently the highest number of purchased barrels and cisterns. The AMC of
Subbasin E is nearly double that of Subbasins B, C, and D, only with additional spending
of nearly $2,000. In this case, the grand coalition provides the watershed with the highest
overall flood damage savings, but is not the most cost-effective coalition, as it is not the
coalition with the lowest SSR. The lowest SSR belongs to the coalition only containing
Subbasin E, followed by coalitions DE, CE, C, BE, D, CDE, and so forth, illustrating that
the most cost-effective GI planning options are those which include spending in Subbasin
E and exclude spending in Subbasin A, the latter of which has the highest SSR, making
Subbasin A the least cost-effective place to focus GI spending for flood damage
reduction purposes. The grand coalition generated the highest overall flood damage
savings of $9,569 (rounded to the nearest dollar). These findings are significant as they
indicate watershed GI spending would go farther in the way of flood reduction in
Subbasin E than any other subbasin.
With 12-hour drain delays, Subbasin E still offers the highest Shapley value,
which is also greater than in the no underdrain scenario. Subbasin D, which shared the
lowest Shapley value with Subbasin B in the previous scenario, has the second highest
Shapley value, exceeding Subbasin A at approximately half the GI cost. Subbasin E still
has the lowest SSR, followed by coalitions DE, CE, D, BE, BDE, and CDE. However, in
this case, the grand coalition does have the highest TRC reduction, and has the highest
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SSR, acting as the least cost-effective option for flood damage savings. The grand
coalition saves the watershed $12,603, which is greater than the grand coalition savings
in the no underdrain scenario, but lower than coalition ADE in the 12-hour drain delay
scenario, which has the potential to save the watershed a total of $14,782.
The differences in Shapley value distributions for the two underdrain scenarios
make it apparent that upstream barrel and cistern drain release times in each subbasin
have an effect on downstream subbasin flood damage reduction abilities. Hydrographs
illustrating these changes for all games can be referenced in Appendices A through D.
In the second game scenario, “Equal Storage”, all subbasins install 14 cisterns and
therefore have equivalent GI costs as well as equivalent rainfall storage capacities while
treating different amounts of impervious area, as these values are dependent on subbasin
average Commercial building sizes. Number and percentage of participating players, total
GI cost, and IAT are shown in Table 5.6. Shapley values and spending for the two
drainage scenarios are shown in Figure 5.18. TRC savings per scenario are shown in
Figure 5.19. SSRs are shown in Figure 5.20. In the no underdrain scenario, Subbasin E
has the highest Shapley value. The coalition which is able to save the system the most in
flood damage repairs is the one which consists of only Subbasin E, and also has the
lowest SSR, making it the most cost-effective GI plan. Again, it is found that coalitions
which contain Subbasin E are the most cost effective, with coalitions DE, CE, BE, D, C,
and CDE following Subbasin E with the next lowest SSR values. Subbasin A is still the
least cost-efficient option. The grand coalition saves the system $8,656 in TRC.
When cisterns have a 12-hour drain delay, Shapley values increase for all
subbasins, but maintain the same relation to one another as in the no underdrain scenario,
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Table 5.6: Game 2: Equal Storage; LID Quantities, Costs, and IAT
Subbasin Households with LIDs
Number % of Total
A
0
0%
B
0
0%
C
D
0
0%
E
-

Businesses with LIDs
Number % of Total
14
56%
14
82.4%
14
100%
14
100%
14
87.5%

IAT (%) GI Cost (USD)
22.4
45.1
47.2
31.8
37.8

$23,520
$23,520
$23,520
$23,520
$23,520

$25,000

3500
$20,000

Shapley Value

3000
2500

$15,000

2000
$10,000

1500
1000

$5,000

500
0
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B
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D
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No Underdrains

12-Hour Drain Delays

GI cost

Figure 5.18: Game 2: Equal Storage Scenario, Subbasin Shapley Values and Total GI
Costs
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GI Cost per Subbasin (USD)

4000

Figure 5.19: Game 2: Equal Storage Scenario Coalition
TRC Reductions
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Figure 5.20: Game 2: Equal Storage Scenario Coalition GI Dollars Spent
per TRC Dollars Saved (Spent/Saved Ratio)
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increasing from Subbasin A to Subbasin E. Subbasin A is still contributing the least to
overall TRC reduction, only treating 22.4% of its impervious area in this game versus
100% in the previous game and is still the least cost-efficient option. The grand coalition
saves the system $13,205 in TRC, but the highest TRC savings for this game scenario are
brought about by coalition ACDE, saving $14,278, implying that the addition of and
spending on GI with 12-hour drain delays in Subbasin B creates additional flood
damages. Here, it is again shown that drain delays on widely distributed GI has the ability
to affect hydrological processes and outcomes within the watershed.
In Game 3, “20% IAT”, each subbasin treats a minimum of and as close to 20%
of its impervious area using 2,000-gallon cisterns. Number and percentage of
participating players, total GI cost, and IAT are shown in Table 5.7. Shapley value results
and total spending are presented for the two drain scenarios in Figure 5.21. TRC savings
per scenario are shown in Figure 5.22. SSRs are shown for both scenarios in Figure 5.23.
With no underdrains, Subbasin E again has the highest Shapley value, having the highest
AMC to flood damage savings for the entire watershed and treating approximately 20%
of its area at a lower cost than both Subbasins A and D. As in the previous games,
Subbasin E has the lowest SSR and is therefore the most cost-effective option for GI
installation, and Subbasin A has the highest SSR. The grand coalition in this case saves
the watershed $5,590 in TRC and is the coalition with the highest TRC savings.
When 12-hour cistern drain delays are considered, Shapley values increase for all
subbasins, and Subbasin E's value more than doubles. The subbasins remain in the same
order of increasing AMCs as in the no underdrain scenario, aside from Subbasin C
having the lowest Shapley value rather than Subbasin B. As in the previous scenario,
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Table 5.7: Game 3: 20% IAT Scenario LID Quantities, Costs, and IAT
Subbasin Households with LIDs
Number % of Total
A
0
0%
B
0
0%
C
D
0
0%
E
-

Businesses with LIDs
Number % of Total
13
52%
7
41.2%
6
42.9%
9
64.3%
8
50%

IAT (%) GI Cost (USD)
20.8
22.5
20.3
20.4
21.6

$21,840
$11,760
$10,080
$15,120
$13,440

$25,000

3000

Shapley Value

$20,000
2500
2000

$15,000

1500

$10,000

1000
$5,000
500
0

GI Cost per Subbasin (USD)

3500

$-

A

B

C

D

E
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No Underdrains

12-Hour Drain Delays
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Figure 5.21: Game 3: 20% IAT Scenario, Subbasin Shapley Values and Total GI Costs

70

Figure 5.22: Game 3: 20% IAT Scenario Coalition TRC
Reductions
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Figure 5.23: Game 3: 20% IAT Scenario Coalition GI Dollars
Spent per TRC Dollars Saved (Spent/Saved Ratio)
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Subbasins E and A remain the most and least cost-effective locations for GI focus,
respectively. The grand coalition in this instance saves the watershed $11,571 in TRCs.
This is the first game in which the no underdrain and delayed drain scenario grand
coalitions have both resulted in the highest TRC savings. This may be due to
considerably higher IAT values across the subbasins in the first two games, so the
stormwater volume released after the two drain delays does not have a significant effect
on neighboring subbasins by way of increased flood depth.
In Game 4, “Maxed, 5,000-Gallon Cisterns in Subbasin E”, game set up is the
same for most subbasins as in the first Maxed game, but to address that Subbasin E is the
most cost-effective location for GI placement in all the other games and Subbasin A is
the least, in this scenario a portion of Subbasin A’s GI funding is given to Subbasin E.
Subbasin A keeps its Residential barrels, but no longer has funding for its 25 Commercial
building cisterns. The cost of these 25 2000-gallon cisterns is given to Subbasin E and
used to install 5,000-gallon cisterns on all 16 of its Commercial buildings rather than the
16 2,000-gallon cisterns it had previously. Updated number and percentage of
participating players, total GI cost, and IAT are shown in Table 5.8. Shapley value results
and total spending are presented for the two drain scenarios in Figure 5.24. TRC savings
per scenario are shown in Figure 5.25. SSRs are shown for both scenarios in Figure 5.26.
As expected, in the no underdrains scenario, Subbasin A only installs barrels for its
Residential properties and has the lowest GI cost and Shapley value, and Subbasin E
spends more than double than Subbasins B, C, and D, and has a Shapley value
approximately 5 times greater. Similar to previous games, Subbasins E and A have the
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Table 5.8: Game 4: Maxed, 5,000-gallon Cisterns in Subbasin E Scenario LID
Quantities, Costs, and IAT
Businesses with LIDs
Number % of Total
0
0%
17
100%
14
100%
14
100%
16
100%

IAT (%) GI Cost (USD)
8.5
57.0
47.2
36.6
43.2

$3,105
$29,020
$23,520
$24,440
$68,880
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$70,000
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$60,000
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$50,000

4000

$40,000

3000

$30,000

2000

$20,000

1000

$10,000

GI Cost per Subbasin (USD)

Shapley Value

Subbasin Households with LIDs
Number % of Total
A
27
100%
B
4
100%
C
D
8
100%
E
-

$-

0
A

B

C

D

E

Subbasin
No Underdrains

12-Hour Drain Delay

GI cost

Figure 5.24: Game 4: Maxed, 5,000-gallon Cisterns in Subbasin E Scenario, Subbasin
Shapley Values and Total GI Costs
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Figure 5.25: Game 4: Maxed, 5,000-gallon Cisterns in
Subbasin E Scenario Coalition TRC Reductions

75

Figure 5.26: Game 4: Maxed, 5,000-gallon Cisterns in Subbasin E
Scenario Coalition GI Dollars Spent per TRC Dollars Saved
(Spent/Saved Ratio)
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lowest and highest SSR values, respectively. The grand coalition results in the watersheds
highest TRC savings, a total of $13,270.
In the 12-hour drain delay scenario, Subbasins A and E still have the lowest and
highest Shapley values, respectively, as well as the highest and lowest SSRs,
respectively. Shapley values do not strictly increase with GI spending in this case, as
AMCs to TRC savings decrease for Subbasins B, C, D, and E. The grand coalition
provides a TRC reduction of $15,296, but flood damage cost reductions are higher under
coalition ABDE, which produces $17,177 in savings, the highest of all games considered
thus far.
Finally, to observe the effects of GI rebates on cost effectiveness across the
watershed, two variations of the Game 1: “Maxed” scenario are considered. In the first,
Game 5: “Maxed, Rebate A”, each subbasin is reimbursed $5,000 in GI cost for every
10% of its IAT through rainwater harvesting. The number and percentage of participating
players and IAT, which are unchanged from those in Game 1, are shown with the updated
GI costs which take Rebate A’s savings into account in Table 5.9. Shapley values are
unchanged, but they are shown for both drainage scenarios against new rebate-affected
GI costs in Figure 5.27. Coalition flood damage savings are unchanged from Game 1 are
referenced in Figure 5.16. Rebate updated SSRs for the no underdrain and 12-hour drain
delay scenarios are shown in Figure 5.28.
In Game 6, “Maxed, Rebate B”, each subbasin’s GI cost is reimbursed $7,000 per
15% of its impervious area treated through rainwater harvesting. Maxed scenario player
information and updated GI costs are shown in Table 5.10. Shapley values and new costs
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Table 5.9: Game 5: Maxed, Rebate A Scenario LID Quantities, Costs, and IAT
Subbasin Households with LIDs Businesses with LIDs IAT (%) GI Cost
with Rebate
Number % of Total Number % of Total
(USD)
A
27
100%
25
100%
48.5
$25,105
B
4
100%
17
100%
57.0
$4,020
C
14
100%
47.2
$3,520
D
8
100%
14
100%
36.6
$9,440
E
16
100%
43.2
$6,880

Table 5.10: Game 6: Maxed, Rebate B Scenario; LID Quantities, Costs, and IAT
Subbasin Households with
LIDs
Number % of Total
A
27
100%
B
4
100%
C
D
8
100%
E
-

Businesses with
LIDs
Number % of Total
25
100%
17
100%
14
100%
14
100%
16
100%
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IAT
(%)
48.5
57.0
47.2
36.6
43.2

GI Cost
with Rebate
(USD)
$22,472
$2,420
$1,493
$7,360
$6,720
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Figure 5.27: Game 5: Maxed, Rebate A Scenario, Subbasin Shapley Values and Total GI
Costs
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Figure 5.28: Game 5: Maxed, Rebate A Scenario Coalition GI Dollars Spent per
TRC Dollars Saved (Spent/Saved Ratio
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for both drainage scenarios against new rebate affected GI costs are shown in Figure
5.29. Coalition flood damage savings are still unchanged from Game 1 and can also be
referenced in Figure 5.16, and rebate updated SSRs for both drain scenarios are shown in
Figure 5.30. Total rebate savings for Games 5 and 6 are shown in Table 5.11. Subbasins
B, D, and E save more on GI spending under the application of Rebate A while Subbasins
A and C save more under Rebate B. In both cases and for all drain scenarios, Subbasin A
remains the least cost-effective option, saving the lowest amount of flood reduction
dollars per GI dollar spent. Most notably, in Games 5 and 6, for the first time Subbasin E
does not have the lowest SSR. In all drain scenarios where rebates are enacted, Subbasin
C has the lowest SSR. In both scenarios with no underdrains, the most cost-effective
coalition C is followed by CE, BC, and E. Under Rebate A, the 12-hour drain delay
scenario lowest SSR coalition is C, followed directly by coalition E. Under Rebate B, the
12-hour drain release again demonstrates an effect on subbasin storage capacity, as
Subbasin E has the fifth lowest SSR in this case, the highest value it has had in any game.
5.4 DISCUSSION
Shapley values and cost comparisons for varying GI implementation plans under
historic South Carolina 2015 flood event conditions, using urban flood modeling tool
PCSWM, were estimated and used to identify which subarea, or subareas, of the Market
Street watershed should be the focus of governing bodies and planners aiming to either
implement GI or focus GI advocacy for the purpose of reducing property damages due to
a combination of tide and rainfall induced flooding.
Table 5.12 contains a summary of findings for all considered games. Across all
tested GI plans, Subbasin E had the highest AMC to flood induced building replacement
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Table 5.11: GI Cost Rebate Savings per Subbasin
Subbasin
A
B
C
D
E

Game 5: Rebate A
$20,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$20,000

Game 6: Rebate B
$21,000
$21,000
$21,000
$14,000
$14,000
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Table 5.12: Summary of Game Results: Shapley Values, SSRs, and Coalition TRC Savings
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Figure 5.29: Game 6: Maxed, Rebate B Scenario, Subbasin Shapley Values and Total GI
Costs
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Figure 5.30: Game 6: Maxed, Rebate B Scenario Coalition GI Dollars Spent per
TRC Dollars Saved (Spent/Saved Ratio)
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cost savings for the Market Street watershed overall than any other subbasin, even though
Subbasin C experienced the highest flood damage costs in the baseline scenario.
Overwhelmingly, Coalition E also had the lowest SSR, saving more in repair dollars per
GI dollars spent than any other coalition in every case aside from Games 5 and 6, in
which rebates were considered in the cost efficiency metric. This is likely caused by
several factors inherent to Subbasin E, including that it has the smallest subbasin area
causing flood depth measurements over the subbasin to be higher than some of its
neighboring subbasins which each received a uniform amount of rainfall. Additionally,
Subbasin E has the lowest infiltration capacity, as it has the overall largest amount of
impervious area and the highest percentage of high intensity developed land cover. From
the digital elevation model, the majority of significant depression areas in the watershed
are also in this subbasin, lining Market Street itself. Finally, Subbasin E is connected to
Outfall 6.5 (Figure 4.10), one of two outfalls in the watershed that is tidally influenced,
and which repeatedly had the highest inflow volume across all simulated games,
therefore making the drainage network in the Subbasin E particularly vulnerable to
backflow induced flooding.
The use of CGT in conjunction with PCSWMM allowed for consideration of
other factors in addition to which subbasin experienced the most baseline flooding,
which, considered alone, would have suggested GI be focused in Subbasin C. Shapley
values, based on total flood damage costs, encompassed PCSWMM inputs and flooding
results, which inherently consider other factors which were able to point to Subbasin E
being the ideal location for GI focus, such as it consisting of the smallest pervious area,
highest ratio of high intensity development land cover, and smallest subbasin area. The
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games which instituted rebates are the only scenarios where Subbasin C is considered the
most cost-efficient location for GI under Maxed conditions.
In both games which institute rebates, Subbasin C receives the same amount or
more in rebates for GI than Subbasin E. Subbasin C saves an additional $7,000 under
Rebate B conditions, even though Subbasin C is treating only an additional 4% of its
IAT. However, under Equal Storage and spending conditions in Game 2, Subbasin E has
higher Shapley values than Subbasin C in both drainage scenarios, and therefore higher
AMCs to overall watershed flood damage savings. In every other game scenario
explored, Subbasin E alone has been the most cost-effective option for GI placement,
suggesting this would be the recommended area for GI and GI advocacy focus. From a
policy standpoint, these results suggest that governing bodies offering GI spending
assistance or rebates based solely on community or watershed IAT benchmarks fail to
take into consideration things like total area, building GI capacity, and flood reduction
need.
Coalition A provided the least cost reduction returns per GI dollar spent, and
Subbasin A had the lowest Shapley value for both drainage scenarios in the Equal
Storage and, expectedly, in the Maxed, 5,000-gallon Cisterns in Subbasin E games. In the
other Maxed scenarios, Subbasin A consistently had the highest GI cost, due to it
containing the highest number of buildings. Even in the 20% IAT scenario, Subbasin A
had to spend double what Subbasins B and C spent on GI in order to reach the 20% IAT
benchmark due to its relatively small average building sizes. These high cost, low return
results led to the suggested scenario where Subbasin E received Subbasin A’s Maxed
cistern funding to install larger cisterns, and notably, this scenario saved the watershed
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the most flood damage repair costs in both drainage scenarios out of all modeled games,
the highest being the 12-hour drain delay scenario with a savings of approximately
$17,200 for the watershed.
Finally, the drain scenario comparisons are valuable in their ability to show that
while rainwater harvesting for the purpose of water recycling and cost savings within
one's home or business can be beneficial, the drain delay scenarios unsurprisingly allow
for more overall flood damage savings for the watershed as a whole. Additional analysis
could be performed to determine more advantageous drain times and barrel locations, as
the hydrographs provided in Appendices A through D give insight to how simultaneous
draining of even Residential sized barrels, when distributed widely enough, can have an
effect on downstream stormwater management capacity. Most notable is the Shapley
value analysis which shows, unintuitively, that the watershed saves more in flood damage
repair costs under coalitions other than the grand coalition when barrels and cisterns have
12-hour drain delays instituted in multiple games, including Coalition ADE in Game 1,
ACDE in Game 2, and ABDE in Game 4.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Game theory can be used to predict outcomes of human decision-making when
self-interested parties are faced with conflict. Cooperative, and in this case, coalitional
analysis, is used to predict how self-interested parties may form to better their individual
outcomes. For this research, a coalitional game theory (CGT) solution concept, the
Shapley value, was leveraged to observe how subgroups should work together to better
serve the overall system, and by association, themselves. Results of this research serve to
inform governing bodies, city planners, and relevant stakeholders by showing which
subareas benefit the system most, through flood damage repair cost savings and cost
efficiency. Even without the intention of government level green infrastructure (GI)
project installation, these results serve to show where GI information campaigns should
be focused to encourage individual property owners to participate in stormwater
management strategies. Additionally, CGT shows which areas of the watershed working
in conjunction is best for the watershed overall, so planners can strategically work within
more than one community, neighborhood, or modeled subarea at a time. Overall, based
on Shapley values and the utilized cost efficiency metric, results suggest GI spending,
placement, and advocacy focus in Subbasin E, surrounding Market Street itself.
Of course, results would vary widely under a different set of modeling constraints
and assumptions, for example if buildings could have more than one means of rainwater
harvesting, if Homeowners Association restraints were considered for residential
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properties, or if commercial buildings were additionally outfitted with underground
cisterns. Regardless of the assumptions in place, the application of CGT to stormwater
modeling and flood reduction practices allows for consideration of budget constraints,
basin area, land cover, and drainage characteristics, rainfall-runoff processes, and both
building and property size, type, and location simultaneously.
Additionally, the methods described here are highly versatile, as what the Shapley
value measures is up to the discretion of the modeler, and PCSWMM can model any
number of environmental conditions and storm events. If Shapley values measured not
cost reductions, but overall flood volume reduction, there would be an entirely different
analysis to be had. Leveraging PCSWMM results, Shapley values could be based on
subcatchments’ flood volume reduction, junction inflows, subbasin peak runoff values, or
any number of other parameters, to compare any number of land development changes or
GI choices, whose accuracy and insight could only stand to be improved through use of
PCSWMM’s 2D modeling capabilities. Additional suggestions for future work include
the following:
•

Use of a 2D hydrodynamic model to simulate compound flooding and dynamic
boundary conditions for the Charleston Peninsula

•

Development of a less computationally complex and time intensive simulation
model capable of managing a larger number of both players and possible
coalitions

•

Consideration of stakeholder and water manager input when developing game
scenarios
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•

Simulation of additional design storms, future storms, and flood events under
projected climate conditions to develop stochastic games and estimate Shapley
values

•

Introduction of uncertainty in player behavior by combining game theory
applications with hierarchical agent-based modeling strategies

•

Development of additional human behavior studies concerning individual
likelihood to partake in green stormwater management strategies and common
barriers, as described for residents of South Carolina’s coastal counties in (Ureta
et al., 2021)

•

Open dialogue with historic property owners and city managers to determine
which adaptation strategies are appropriate for their sites in order to design
feasible modeling institutions and flood adaption options for specific properties
As sea levels climb at accelerated rates and climate variations continue to alter

storm intensity and frequency, the world's coastal communities will become increasingly
vulnerable to the unequally distributed risks associated with the coupling of these events.
Stakeholders and public alike will need novel approaches and nuanced responses to the
combined effects of tide and stormwater induced flooding. Planners will be faced with
increasingly difficult decisions regarding prioritization of infrastructure and related
spending which can only stand to be improved by further exploration of human choices
and consequent outcomes within the field of water resources management.
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APPENDIX A
GAME SCENARIO HYDROGRAPHS
The following are PCSWMM hydrographs which illustrate changes in
hydrological processes observed during the modeled historic South Carolina 2015 flood
event in Charleston’s Market Street watershed. Comparisons highlight notable
differences in system flood and runoff volumes, subbasin runoff volumes, and junction
flood volumes between the no underdrain and drain scenarios and also between the most
flood damage cost saving coalitions for each game. Because the hydrographs are taken
directly from PCSWMM results, some model components are labeled differently. On
some of the graphs provided, Subbasins A, B, C, D, E are referred to as Subbasins 6.1,
6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5, respectively. Additionally, the words node and junction are used
interchangeably. Node locations within each subbasin can be referred to in Figure 4.10.
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A.1 Game 1 System Flooding
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Figure A.1: Game 1 “Maxed” System Flooding

A.2 Game 1 System Runoff
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Figure A.2: Game 1 System Runoff

A.3 Game 1 Subbasin A Runoff
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Figure A.3: Game 1 Subbasin A Runoff

A.4 Game 1 Subbasin B Runoff
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Figure A.3: Game 1 Subbasin B Runoff

A.5 Game 1 Subbasin C Runoff

104
Figure A.5: Game 1 Subbasin C Runoff

A.6 Game 1 Subbasin D Runoff
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Figure A.6: Game 1 Subbasin D Runoff

A.7 Game 1 Subbasin E Runoff
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Figure A.7: Game 1 Subbasin E Runoff

A.8 Game 1 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding
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Figure A.8: Game 1 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding

Figure A.9 Game 1 Junction 6.4.2 Flooding
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Figure A.9: Game 1 Junction 6.4.2 Flooding

Figure A.10: Game 1 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding
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Figure A.10: Game 1 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding

A.11 Game 1 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding
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Figure A.11: Game 1 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding

Figure A.12 Game 1 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding
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Figure A.12: Game 1 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding

A.13 Game 1 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding
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Figure A.13: Game 1 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding

APPENDIX B
GAME 2 HYDROGRAPHS
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B.1 Game 2 System Flooding
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Figure B.1: Game 2 System Flooding

B.2 Game 2 System Runoff
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Figure B.2: Game 2 System Runoff

B.3 Game 2 Subbasin A Runoff
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Figure B.3: Game 2 Subbasin A Runoff

B.4 Game 2 Subbasin B Runoff

117
Figure B.4: Game 2 Subbasin B Runoff

B.5 Game 2 Subbasin C Runoff
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Figure B.5: Game 2 Subbasin C Runoff

B.6 Game 2 Subbasin D Runoff
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Figure B.6: Game 2 Subbasin D Runoff

B.7 Game 2 Subbasin E Runoff
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Figure B.7: Game 2 Subbasin E Runoff

B.8 Game 2 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding
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Figure B.8: Game 2 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding

B.9 Game 2 Junction 6.4.2 Flooding
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Figure B.9: Game 2 Junction 6.4.2 Flooding

B.10 Game 2 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding
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Figure B.10: Game 2 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding

B.11 Game 2 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding
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Figure B.11: Game 2 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding

B.12 Game 2 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding
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Figure B.12: Game 2 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding

B.13 Game 2 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding
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Figure B.13: Game 2 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding
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GAME 3 HYDROGRAPHS
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C.1 Game 3 System Flooding
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Figure C.1: Game 3 System Flooding

C.2 Game 3 System Runoff
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Figure C.2: Game 3 System Runoff

C.3 Game 3 Subbasin A Runoff
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Figure C.3: Game 3 Subbasin A Runoff

C.4 Game 3 Subbasin B Runoff
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Figure C.4: Game 3 Subbasin B Runoff

C.5 Game 3 Subbasin C Runoff
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Figure C.5: Game 3 Subbasin C Runoff

C.6 Game 3 Subbasin D Runoff
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Figure C.6: Game 3 Subbasin D Runoff

C.7 Game 3 Subbasin E Runoff
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Figure C.7: Game 3 Subbasin E Runoff

C.8 Game 3 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding
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Figure C.8: Game 3 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding

C.9 Game 3 Junction 6.4.2 Flooding
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Figure C.9: Game 3 Junction 6.4.2 Flooding

C.10 Game 3 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding
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Figure C.10: Game 3 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding

C.11 Game 3 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding
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Figure C.11: Game 3 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding

C.12 Game 3 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding
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Figure C.12: Game 3 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding

C.13 Game 3 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding
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Figure C.13: Game 3 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding
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GAME 4 HYDROGRAPHS
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D.1 Game 4 System Flooding
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Figure D.1: Game 4 System Flooding

D.2 Game 4 System Runoff
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Figure D.2: Game 4 System Runoff

D.3 Game 4 Subbasin A Runoff
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Figure D.3: Game 4 Subbasin A Runoff

D.4 Game 4 Subbasin B Runoff
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Figure D.4: Game 4 Subbasin B Runoff

D.5 Game 4 Subbasin C Runoff
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Figure D.5: Game 4 Subbasin C Runoff

D.6 Game 4 Subbasin D Runoff
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Figure D.6 Game 4 Subbasin D Runoff

D.7 Game 4 Subbasin E Runoff
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Figure D.7: Game 4 Subbasin E Runoff

D.8 Game 4 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding
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Figure D.8: Game 4 Junction 6.3.4 Flooding

D.9 Game 4 Junction 6.4.2
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Figure D.9: Game 4 Junction 6.4.2

D.10 Game 4 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding
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Figure D.10: Game 4 Junction 6.4.4 Flooding

D.11 Game 4 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding
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Figure D.11: Game 4 Junction 6.4.5 Flooding

D.12: Game 4 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding
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Figure D.12: Game 4 Junction 6.5.1 Flooding

D.13 Game 4 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding
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Figure D.13: Game 4 Junction 6.5.5 Flooding

